What is he best known for?
The fields of study he is best known for:
- Artificial intelligence
- The Internet
- Programming language
David C. Parkes mostly deals with Mathematical economics, Mechanism design, Combinatorial auction, Mathematical optimization and Auction theory.
His Mathematical economics course of study focuses on Microeconomics and Proxy.
His Mechanism design study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Incentive, Incentive compatibility, Multi-agent system, World Wide Web and Game theory.
His work in Combinatorial auction tackles topics such as Artificial intelligence which are related to areas like Normative, Construct, Homo economicus and Rationality.
His Mathematical optimization study combines topics in areas such as Ranking, Parameterized complexity and Model selection.
A component of his Auction theory study involves Common value auction and Bidding.
His most cited work include:
- Secure data interchange (1802 citations)
- Location enhanced information delivery system (1310 citations)
- Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice (360 citations)
What are the main themes of his work throughout his whole career to date?
His main research concerns Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Artificial intelligence, Mechanism design and Mathematical economics.
His study in Common value auction is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Bidding and Revenue.
His Artificial intelligence research includes themes of Machine learning and Task.
His Mechanism design research focuses on Incentive and how it relates to Mechanism.
His work deals with themes such as Robustness and Price of anarchy, which intersect with Mathematical economics.
His Combinatorial auction research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Forward auction and Auction algorithm.
He most often published in these fields:
- Mathematical optimization (17.40%)
- Common value auction (16.18%)
- Artificial intelligence (15.44%)
What were the highlights of his more recent work (between 2018-2021)?
- Artificial intelligence (15.44%)
- Microeconomics (12.50%)
- Computer security (9.07%)
In recent papers he was focusing on the following fields of study:
David C. Parkes mainly focuses on Artificial intelligence, Microeconomics, Computer security, Markov decision process and Mechanism design.
His work carried out in the field of Artificial intelligence brings together such families of science as Machine learning and Key.
Many of his research projects under Computer security are closely connected to Block and Counterattack with Block and Counterattack, tying the diverse disciplines of science together.
His Mechanism design study integrates concerns from other disciplines, such as Incentive compatibility and Mathematical optimization.
His Mathematical optimization research integrates issues from Social choice theory and Outcome.
David C. Parkes interconnects Bidding, Dynamic inconsistency and Resource allocation in the investigation of issues within Strategic dominance.
Between 2018 and 2021, his most popular works were:
- Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning (46 citations)
- How Do Fairness Definitions Fare?: Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness (38 citations)
- Fairness without Harm: Decoupled Classifiers with Preference Guarantees (28 citations)
In his most recent research, the most cited papers focused on:
- Artificial intelligence
- The Internet
- Programming language
His primary scientific interests are in Artificial intelligence, Microeconomics, Task, Incentive compatibility and Delegation.
His Urban computing research extends to the thematically linked field of Artificial intelligence.
David C. Parkes has researched Microeconomics in several fields, including Baseline and Harm.
His research in Incentive compatibility intersects with topics in Supply and demand, Flexibility, Mathematical optimization and Mechanism design.
His Mathematical optimization study incorporates themes from Artificial neural network, Frame, Common value auction, Deep learning and Revenue.
The concepts of his Mechanism design study are interwoven with issues in Social choice theory, Facility location problem and Outcome.
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