2018 - ACM Fellow For contributions to computational markets, including novel mechanism design and incentive engineering methods
2014 - Fellow of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) For significant contributions to multi-agent systems research through advances in auctions and mechanism design and development of the CS-economics research community.
2005 - Fellow of Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
David C. Parkes mostly deals with Mathematical economics, Mechanism design, Combinatorial auction, Mathematical optimization and Auction theory. His Mathematical economics course of study focuses on Microeconomics and Proxy. His Mechanism design study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Incentive, Incentive compatibility, Multi-agent system, World Wide Web and Game theory.
His work in Combinatorial auction tackles topics such as Artificial intelligence which are related to areas like Normative, Construct, Homo economicus and Rationality. His Mathematical optimization study combines topics in areas such as Ranking, Parameterized complexity and Model selection. A component of his Auction theory study involves Common value auction and Bidding.
His main research concerns Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Artificial intelligence, Mechanism design and Mathematical economics. His study in Common value auction is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Bidding and Revenue. His Artificial intelligence research includes themes of Machine learning and Task.
His Mechanism design research focuses on Incentive and how it relates to Mechanism. His work deals with themes such as Robustness and Price of anarchy, which intersect with Mathematical economics. His Combinatorial auction research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Forward auction and Auction algorithm.
David C. Parkes mainly focuses on Artificial intelligence, Microeconomics, Computer security, Markov decision process and Mechanism design. His work carried out in the field of Artificial intelligence brings together such families of science as Machine learning and Key. Many of his research projects under Computer security are closely connected to Block and Counterattack with Block and Counterattack, tying the diverse disciplines of science together.
His Mechanism design study integrates concerns from other disciplines, such as Incentive compatibility and Mathematical optimization. His Mathematical optimization research integrates issues from Social choice theory and Outcome. David C. Parkes interconnects Bidding, Dynamic inconsistency and Resource allocation in the investigation of issues within Strategic dominance.
His primary scientific interests are in Artificial intelligence, Microeconomics, Task, Incentive compatibility and Delegation. His Urban computing research extends to the thematically linked field of Artificial intelligence. David C. Parkes has researched Microeconomics in several fields, including Baseline and Harm.
His research in Incentive compatibility intersects with topics in Supply and demand, Flexibility, Mathematical optimization and Mechanism design. His Mathematical optimization study incorporates themes from Artificial neural network, Frame, Common value auction, Deep learning and Revenue. The concepts of his Mechanism design study are interwoven with issues in Social choice theory, Facility location problem and Outcome.
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Secure data interchange
Frederick S. M. Herz;Walter Paul Labys;David C. Parkes;Sampath Kannan.
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
David C. Parkes.
Location enhanced information delivery system
Frederick Herz;Jonathan M. Smith;David C. Parkes.
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
David C. Parkes;Lyle H. Ungar.
national conference on artificial intelligence (2000)
Computational-mechanism design: a call to arms
R.K. Dash;N.R. Jennings;D.C. Parkes.
IEEE Intelligent Systems (2003)
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
David Christopher Parkes;Lyle H. Ungar.
Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks
Jeffrey Shneidman;David C. Parkes.
international workshop on peer-to-peer systems (2003)
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
David C. Parkes;Jayant Kalagnanam;Marta Eso.
international joint conference on artificial intelligence (2001)
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
David C. Parkes.
electronic commerce (1999)
Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
David C. Parkes;Jayant Kalagnanam.
Management Science (2005)
Profile was last updated on December 6th, 2021.
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