2014 - ACM Fellow For contributions to and leadership in the theory and practice of privacy and security.
Paul Syverson spends much of his time researching Computer security, Computer network, Onion routing, Cryptography and Traffic analysis. His work on Anonymity as part of general Computer security study is frequently connected to Flood myth, therefore bridging the gap between diverse disciplines of science and establishing a new relationship between them. In general Computer network study, his work on Node often relates to the realm of Wireless ad hoc network, thereby connecting several areas of interest.
His Onion routing research includes themes of Mix network and Server. He interconnects Anonymous web browsing and Router in the investigation of issues within Mix network. His Cryptographic protocol and Hash-based message authentication code study in the realm of Cryptography interacts with subjects such as Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem.
The scientist’s investigation covers issues in Computer security, Computer network, Anonymity, Onion routing and Cryptographic protocol. His Computer security research includes elements of The Internet and Communications protocol. His work deals with themes such as Mix network and Distributed computing, which intersect with Computer network.
His work carried out in the field of Anonymity brings together such families of science as Adversary, Peer-to-peer, Internet privacy and Communications system. As part of one scientific family, Paul Syverson deals mainly with the area of Onion routing, narrowing it down to issues related to the Policy-based routing, and often Multipath routing. His studies in Cryptographic protocol integrate themes in fields like Theoretical computer science, Formal specification and Key distribution.
Paul Syverson mainly investigates Computer security, Computer network, Onion routing, The Internet and Anonymity. His work on Network architecture, Adversary model, Network security and Adversary as part of general Computer security research is frequently linked to Internet exchange point, thereby connecting diverse disciplines of science. When carried out as part of a general Computer network research project, his work on Bandwidth, Network performance and Latency is frequently linked to work in Throughput, therefore connecting diverse disciplines of study.
The concepts of his Onion routing study are interwoven with issues in Routing, Payment and Server. His The Internet study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Domain, Authentication, Confidentiality and Cryptography. His studies deal with areas such as Private network, File sharing and Liability as well as Anonymity.
His main research concerns Computer network, Computer security, Onion routing, Adversary model and Routing. His research integrates issues of Overlay and Operating system in his study of Computer network. His research in Computer security is mostly concerned with Anonymity.
He has included themes like Adversary, Probabilistic analysis of algorithms and A priori and a posteriori in his Onion routing study. His Adversary model research is multidisciplinary, relying on both The Internet, Multipath routing and Vulnerability. His work on Policy-based routing as part of general Routing study is frequently linked to Confusion, therefore connecting diverse disciplines of science.
This overview was generated by a machine learning system which analysed the scientist’s body of work. If you have any feedback, you can contact us here.
Tor: the second-generation onion router
Roger Dingledine;Nick Mathewson;Paul Syverson.
usenix security symposium (2004)
Anonymous connections and onion routing
M.G. Reed;P.F. Syverson;D.M. Goldschlag.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (1998)
Onion routing
David Goldschlag;Michael Reed;Paul Syverson.
Communications of The ACM (1999)
Anonymous connections and onion routing
P.F. Syverson;D.M. Goldschlag;M.G. Reed.
ieee symposium on security and privacy (1997)
Hiding Routing Information
David M. Goldschlag;Michael G. Reed;Paul F. Syverson.
information hiding (1996)
Onion Routing for Anonymous and Private Internet Connections
David Goldschlag;Michael Reed;Paul Syverson.
(1999)
Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets
Philippe Golle;Markus Jakobsson;Ari Juels;Paul F. Syverson.
the cryptographers’ track at the rsa conference (2004)
On unifying some cryptographic protocol logics
P.F. Syverson;P.C. van Oorschot.
ieee symposium on security and privacy (1994)
A taxonomy of replay attacks [cryptographic protocols]
P. Syverson.
ieee computer security foundations symposium (1994)
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
Paul Syverson;Gene Tsudik;Michael Reed;Carl Landwehr.
privacy enhancing technologies (2001)
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