2013 - Member of Academia Europaea
1988 - Fellows of the Econometric Society
His primary areas of investigation include Mathematical economics, Social choice theory, Voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Domain. The concepts of his Mathematical economics study are interwoven with issues in Range, Decision theory and Incentive. The study incorporates disciplines such as Characterization, May's theorem and Arrow's impossibility theorem in addition to Range.
His Social choice theory study incorporates themes from Positive economics and Single peaked preferences. His work on Cardinal voting systems is typically connected to Stylized fact as part of general Voting study, connecting several disciplines of science. The Domain study combines topics in areas such as Preference, Social welfare function, Econometrics, Function and Monotonic function.
Salvador Barberà focuses on Mathematical economics, Voting, Social choice theory, Microeconomics and Group. His Mathematical economics study integrates concerns from other disciplines, such as Function, Condorcet method and Preference. Salvador Barberà studies Cardinal voting systems which is a part of Voting.
His Social choice theory research incorporates themes from Class, Outcome, Positive economics and Single peaked preferences. His study on Incentive, Common value auction, Spite and Core is often connected to Context as part of broader study in Microeconomics. His study in Group is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Structure, Decision problem and Public good.
His primary areas of study are Mathematical economics, Voting, Social choice theory, Preference and Domain. Salvador Barberà integrates many fields in his works, including Mathematical economics and Strong Nash equilibrium. His Voting research is multidisciplinary, relying on both Majoritarianism, Lexicographical order and Set.
His work carried out in the field of Social choice theory brings together such families of science as Disapproval voting, Voting trust, Positive economics and Single peaked preferences. He combines subjects such as Selfishness and Social connectedness with his study of Arrow's impossibility theorem. His work on Strategic behavior and Incentive as part of general Microeconomics research is often related to Parallels, thus linking different fields of science.
Voting, Microeconomics, Preference, Strategy proofness and Interdependence are his primary areas of study. His Voting study combines topics in areas such as Mathematical economics, Data mining and Power. The various areas that Salvador Barberà examines in his Microeconomics study include Bullet voting, Cardinal voting systems, Mathematical optimization, Supermajority and Existential quantification.
Salvador Barberà frequently studies issues relating to Simple and Preference. Salvador Barberà has included themes like Common value auction, Incentive compatibility and Set in his Strategy proofness study.
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Ranking Sets of Objects
Salvador Barberà;Walter Bossert;Prasanta K. Pattanaik.
Cahier de recherche (2004)
Voting by committees
Salvador Barbera;Hugo Sonnenschein;Lin Zhou.
Econometrica (1991)
Handbook of Utility Theory
Salvador Barberà;Peter J. Hammond;Christian Seidl.
(2004)
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees
Salvador Barberà;Faruk Gul;Ennio Stacchetti.
Journal of Economic Theory (1993)
STRATEGY-PROOF EXCHANGE
Salvador Barbera;Matthew O. Jackson.
Econometrica (1995)
Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
Salvador Barberà;Salvador Barberà;B. Peleg.
Social Choice and Welfare (1990)
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
Salvador Barberà;Matthew O. Jackson.
Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004)
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
José Alcalde;Salvador Barberà.
Economic Theory (1994)
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
Salvador Barberà.
Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS THAT DO NOT LEAVE "TOO MUCH" TO CHANCE'
Salvador Barbera.
Econometrica (1977)
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