D-Index & Metrics Best Publications

D-Index & Metrics D-index (Discipline H-index) only includes papers and citation values for an examined discipline in contrast to General H-index which accounts for publications across all disciplines.

Discipline name D-index D-index (Discipline H-index) only includes papers and citation values for an examined discipline in contrast to General H-index which accounts for publications across all disciplines. Citations Publications World Ranking National Ranking
Economics and Finance D-index 34 Citations 11,149 78 World Ranking 1823 National Ranking 1103

Research.com Recognitions

Awards & Achievements

2007 - Fellows of the Econometric Society

Overview

What is he best known for?

The fields of study he is best known for:

  • Microeconomics
  • Finance
  • Game theory

Lawrence M. Ausubel focuses on Microeconomics, Vickrey auction, English auction, Proxy bid and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction. His study brings together the fields of Mathematical economics and Microeconomics. The Vickrey auction portion of his research involves studies in Auction theory and Common value auction.

His work on Electronic auction as part of general Common value auction research is frequently linked to Intelligent decision support system, bridging the gap between disciplines. The English auction study combines topics in areas such as Unique bid auction and Bid shading. His research integrates issues of Multiunit auction and Auction sniping in his study of Proxy bid.

His most cited work include:

  • Computer implemented methods and apparatus for auctions (681 citations)
  • The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market (572 citations)
  • An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (571 citations)

What are the main themes of his work throughout his whole career to date?

His primary areas of investigation include Common value auction, Microeconomics, Vickrey auction, English auction and Auction theory. His Spectrum auction, Combinatorial auction and Forward auction study, which is part of a larger body of work in Common value auction, is frequently linked to Financial crisis, bridging the gap between disciplines. His Generalized second-price auction and Reverse auction study in the realm of Microeconomics interacts with subjects such as Gains from trade.

Vickrey auction and Market power are frequently intertwined in his study. His English auction research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Unique bid auction, Multiunit auction and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction. His work on Revenue equivalence and Dutch auction as part of general Auction theory study is frequently linked to Open market operation, bridging the gap between disciplines.

He most often published in these fields:

  • Common value auction (53.57%)
  • Microeconomics (47.32%)
  • Vickrey auction (22.32%)

What were the highlights of his more recent work (between 2008-2020)?

  • Common value auction (53.57%)
  • Spectrum auction (15.18%)
  • Microeconomics (47.32%)

In recent papers he was focusing on the following fields of study:

His primary scientific interests are in Common value auction, Spectrum auction, Microeconomics, Financial crisis and Environmental economics. His Common value auction research includes themes of Bidding and Monetary economics. His Spectrum auction research also works with subjects such as

  • Core which intersects with area such as Complete information,
  • License which intersects with area such as Computer security.

His work in the fields of Auction theory and English auction overlaps with other areas such as Forward contract and Spot market. He has included themes like Unique bid auction, Proxy bid, Bid shading and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction in his English auction study. His study in Combinatorial auction is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Mathematical economics and Vickrey auction.

Between 2008 and 2020, his most popular works were:

  • Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (367 citations)
  • Insider Trading In A Rational Expectations Economy (219 citations)
  • Virtual power plant auctions (50 citations)

In his most recent research, the most cited papers focused on:

  • Microeconomics
  • Finance
  • Game theory

Lawrence M. Ausubel focuses on Microeconomics, Common value auction, Auction theory, Bidding and Spectrum auction. His work on Vickrey auction and English auction as part of general Microeconomics research is frequently linked to Spot market and Forward contract, thereby connecting diverse disciplines of science. His Vickrey auction study integrates concerns from other disciplines, such as Unique bid auction, Combinatorial auction and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction.

His Common value auction study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Computer security and Complementary good. The concepts of his Bidding study are interwoven with issues in Competition policy, Market liquidity, Monetary economics, Core and Operations research. The various areas that Lawrence M. Ausubel examines in his Spectrum auction study include Competition, Environmental economics and Portfolio.

This overview was generated by a machine learning system which analysed the scientist’s body of work. If you have any feedback, you can contact us here.

Best Publications

The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market

Lawrence M Ausubel.
The American Economic Review (1991)

1307 Citations

Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

Lawrence M. Ausubel;Peter Cramton.
Research Papers in Economics (2002)

910 Citations

Computer implemented methods and apparatus for auctions

Lawrence M. Ausubel.
(1999)

907 Citations

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Lawrence M. Ausubel;Paul R. Milgrom.
Frontiers of Theoretical Economics (2002)

857 Citations

The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel;Paul Milgrom.
Research Papers in Economics (2004)

703 Citations

Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

Lawrence M. Ausubel;Peter Cramton;Marek Pycia;Marzena Rostek.
The Review of Economic Studies (2014)

682 Citations

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

Lawrence M. Ausubel.
The American Economic Review (2004)

639 Citations

Insider Trading In A Rational Expectations Economy

Lawrence M. Ausubel.
The American Economic Review (2016)

491 Citations

REPUTATION IN BARGAINING AND DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY

Lawrence M. Ausubel;Raymond J. Deneckere.
Econometrica (1989)

489 Citations

Ascending bid auction for multiple objects

Lawrence M. Ausubel.
(2005)

420 Citations

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