His primary areas of study are Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics and Microeconomics. Jason D. Hartline combines subjects such as Incentive, Optimal mechanism, Load balancing and Profit with his study of Mathematical optimization. Auction theory, Generalized second-price auction, Revenue equivalence and Combinatorial auction are the primary areas of interest in his Common value auction study.
His biological study deals with issues like Range, which deal with fields such as Preference, Matroid, Sequence and Polynomial. His study in the fields of Unit demand under the domain of Microeconomics overlaps with other disciplines such as If and only if. His study in Approximation algorithm is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Bayesian probability and Maximization.
Jason D. Hartline focuses on Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics and Optimal mechanism. His work on Maximization as part of general Mathematical optimization research is often related to Simple, thus linking different fields of science. His Common value auction study necessitates a more in-depth grasp of Microeconomics.
His research in Mechanism design intersects with topics in Time complexity, Bayesian probability and Principal. In Mathematical economics, Jason D. Hartline works on issues like Profit, which are connected to Special case. His studies in Optimal mechanism integrate themes in fields like Sequence, Preference and Benchmark.
His scientific interests lie mostly in Mathematical optimization, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics, Common value auction and Outcome. His Maximization study, which is part of a larger body of work in Mathematical optimization, is frequently linked to Simple, bridging the gap between disciplines. His Mechanism design research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Relaxation, Online algorithm and Principal.
Jason D. Hartline has included themes like Regret, Process and Reinforcement learning in his Mathematical economics study. Common value auction is a subfield of Microeconomics that Jason D. Hartline studies. He works mostly in the field of Optimal mechanism, limiting it down to topics relating to Robust optimization and, in certain cases, Approximation algorithm and Robustness.
Jason D. Hartline mostly deals with Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics and Simple. He interconnects Bargaining problem and Competitive analysis in the investigation of issues within Mathematical optimization. His studies deal with areas such as Procurement, Computation, Service and Dimensionality reduction as well as Common value auction.
In general Mechanism design, his work in Optimal mechanism is often linked to Payment linking many areas of study. His Optimal mechanism research incorporates themes from Benchmark, Special case and Piecewise constant approximation. The various areas that Jason D. Hartline examines in his Mathematical economics study include Vickrey auction, Auction theory, Relaxation and Corollary.
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Optimal marketing strategies over social networks
Jason Hartline;Vahab Mirrokni;Mukund Sundararajan.
the web conference (2008)
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
Venkatesan Guruswami;Jason D. Hartline;Anna R. Karlin;David Kempe.
symposium on discrete algorithms (2005)
Competitive auctions and digital goods
Andrew V. Goldberg;Jason D. Hartline;Andrew Wright.
symposium on discrete algorithms (2001)
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
Andrew V. Goldberg;Jason D. Hartline.
european symposium on algorithms (2001)
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Jason D. Hartline;Tim Roughgarden.
electronic commerce (2009)
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Shuchi Chawla;Jason D. Hartline;Robert Kleinberg.
electronic commerce (2007)
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
Jason D. Hartline;Tim Roughgarden.
symposium on the theory of computing (2008)
Near-optimal online auctions
Avrim Blum;Jason D. Hartline.
symposium on discrete algorithms (2005)
Competitive generalized auctions
Amos Fiat;Andrew V. Goldberg;Jason D. Hartline;Anna R. Karlin.
symposium on the theory of computing (2002)
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Jason D. Hartline;Brendan Lucier.
symposium on the theory of computing (2010)
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