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- Jason D. Hartline

Discipline name
H-index
Citations
Publications
World Ranking
National Ranking

Engineering and Technology
D-index
33
Citations
5,112
61
World Ranking
4120
National Ranking
1548

- Statistics
- Game theory
- Algorithm

His primary areas of study are Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics and Microeconomics. Jason D. Hartline combines subjects such as Incentive, Optimal mechanism, Load balancing and Profit with his study of Mathematical optimization. Auction theory, Generalized second-price auction, Revenue equivalence and Combinatorial auction are the primary areas of interest in his Common value auction study.

His biological study deals with issues like Range, which deal with fields such as Preference, Matroid, Sequence and Polynomial. His study in the fields of Unit demand under the domain of Microeconomics overlaps with other disciplines such as If and only if. His study in Approximation algorithm is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Bayesian probability and Maximization.

- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (325 citations)
- Optimal marketing strategies over social networks (321 citations)
- Simple versus optimal mechanisms (264 citations)

Jason D. Hartline focuses on Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics and Optimal mechanism. His work on Maximization as part of general Mathematical optimization research is often related to Simple, thus linking different fields of science. His Common value auction study necessitates a more in-depth grasp of Microeconomics.

His research in Mechanism design intersects with topics in Time complexity, Bayesian probability and Principal. In Mathematical economics, Jason D. Hartline works on issues like Profit, which are connected to Special case. His studies in Optimal mechanism integrate themes in fields like Sequence, Preference and Benchmark.

- Mathematical optimization (44.72%)
- Common value auction (36.02%)
- Mechanism design (36.02%)

- Mathematical optimization (44.72%)
- Mechanism design (36.02%)
- Mathematical economics (33.54%)

His scientific interests lie mostly in Mathematical optimization, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics, Common value auction and Outcome. His Maximization study, which is part of a larger body of work in Mathematical optimization, is frequently linked to Simple, bridging the gap between disciplines. His Mechanism design research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Relaxation, Online algorithm and Principal.

Jason D. Hartline has included themes like Regret, Process and Reinforcement learning in his Mathematical economics study. Common value auction is a subfield of Microeconomics that Jason D. Hartline studies. He works mostly in the field of Optimal mechanism, limiting it down to topics relating to Robust optimization and, in certain cases, Approximation algorithm and Robustness.

- Optimal crowdsourcing contests (28 citations)
- Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms (10 citations)
- Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing (9 citations)

- Statistics
- Game theory
- Mathematical analysis

Jason D. Hartline mostly deals with Mathematical optimization, Common value auction, Mechanism design, Mathematical economics and Simple. He interconnects Bargaining problem and Competitive analysis in the investigation of issues within Mathematical optimization. His studies deal with areas such as Procurement, Computation, Service and Dimensionality reduction as well as Common value auction.

In general Mechanism design, his work in Optimal mechanism is often linked to Payment linking many areas of study. His Optimal mechanism research incorporates themes from Benchmark, Special case and Piecewise constant approximation. The various areas that Jason D. Hartline examines in his Mathematical economics study include Vickrey auction, Auction theory, Relaxation and Corollary.

This overview was generated by a machine learning system which analysed the scientist’s body of work. If you have any feedback, you can contact us here.

Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing

Shuchi Chawla;Jason Hartline;David Malec;Balasubramanian Sivan.

symposium on the theory of computing **(2010)**

462 Citations

Optimal marketing strategies over social networks

Jason Hartline;Vahab Mirrokni;Mukund Sundararajan.

the web conference **(2008)**

438 Citations

Competitive auctions and digital goods

Andrew V. Goldberg;Jason D. Hartline;Andrew Wright.

symposium on discrete algorithms **(2001)**

390 Citations

On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing

Venkatesan Guruswami;Jason D. Hartline;Anna R. Karlin;David Kempe.

symposium on discrete algorithms **(2005)**

377 Citations

Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods

Andrew V. Goldberg;Jason D. Hartline.

european symposium on algorithms **(2001)**

365 Citations

Simple versus optimal mechanisms

Jason D. Hartline;Tim Roughgarden.

electronic commerce **(2009)**

320 Citations

Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations

Shuchi Chawla;Jason D. Hartline;Robert Kleinberg.

electronic commerce **(2007)**

261 Citations

Optimal mechanism design and money burning

Jason D. Hartline;Tim Roughgarden.

symposium on the theory of computing **(2008)**

203 Citations

Competitive generalized auctions

Amos Fiat;Andrew V. Goldberg;Jason D. Hartline;Anna R. Karlin.

symposium on the theory of computing **(2002)**

177 Citations

Near-optimal online auctions

Avrim Blum;Jason D. Hartline.

symposium on discrete algorithms **(2005)**

173 Citations

Journal of Economic Theory

(Impact Factor: 1.79)

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