1989 - Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
1988 - Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association
1975 - Member of the National Academy of Sciences
1970 - Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
1965 - Fellow of John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
1961 - Fellow of John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
1961 - Fellows of the Econometric Society
His main research concerns Mathematical economics, Microeconomics, Repeated game, Equilibrium selection and Stochastic game. His Mathematical economics study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Partial equilibrium, Gains from trade and Market economy. His work on Competitive equilibrium as part of general Microeconomics study is frequently linked to Cooperative Agreements, bridging the gap between disciplines.
His research integrates issues of Strategy, Discounting and Nash equilibrium in his study of Repeated game. His Equilibrium selection research includes elements of Sequential game and Trigger strategy. The Stochastic game study combines topics in areas such as Bayesian game and Partnership game.
Microeconomics, Mathematical economics, Econometrics, Production and Bounded rationality are his primary areas of study. His Microeconomics study combines topics in areas such as Dividend and Earnings. His Nash equilibrium, Repeated game and Complete information study in the realm of Mathematical economics interacts with subjects such as Variance and Zero.
His study in the field of Equilibrium selection is also linked to topics like Corruption. The concepts of his Econometrics study are interwoven with issues in Stochastic process and Bankruptcy. His work deals with themes such as Profit, Linear model and Mathematical optimization, which intersect with Production.
His primary areas of investigation include Microeconomics, Corruption, Government, Strategic analysis and Structure. In general Microeconomics, his work in Game theory, Sequential game and Bounded rationality is often linked to Mussa linking many areas of study. His Game theory study deals with Process intersecting with Public economics.
Roy Radner works mostly in the field of Sequential game, limiting it down to topics relating to Nash equilibrium and, in certain cases, Discounting, Economy and Gross domestic product. His Repeated game research incorporates themes from Common knowledge, Welfare and Distribution. Roy Radner integrates Sustainable development and Mathematical economics in his research.
His main research concerns Sequential game, Tragedy of the commons, World government, Nash equilibrium and International economics. His Sequential game study contributes to a more complete understanding of Mathematical economics. Nash equilibrium overlaps with fields such as Kyoto Protocol and Sovereignty in his research.
His International economics research includes themes of Incentive and Capital, Capital accumulation. His study connects Microeconomics and Discounting. His work in the fields of Microeconomics, such as Returns to scale and Monopoly, overlaps with other areas such as Product and Structure.
This overview was generated by a machine learning system which analysed the scientist’s body of work. If you have any feedback, you can contact us here.
Economic theory of teams
Jacob Marschak;Roy Radner.
(1972)
EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM OF PLANS, PRICES AND PRICE EXPECTATIONS IN A SEQUENCE OF MARKETS
Roy Radner.
Econometrica (1972)
Team Decision Problems
R. Radner.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics (1962)
The organization of decentralized information processing
Roy Radner.
Econometrica (1993)
Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
Roy Radner.
Econometrica (1979)
Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
Roy Radner.
Econometrica (1979)
Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing
Roy Radner.
Research Papers in Economics (2016)
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER UNCERTAINTY.
Roy Radner.
Econometrica (1968)
Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
Roy Radner.
Journal of Economic Theory (1980)
On the allocation of effort
Roy Radner;Michael Rothschild.
Journal of Economic Theory (1975)
If you think any of the details on this page are incorrect, let us know.
We appreciate your kind effort to assist us to improve this page, it would be helpful providing us with as much detail as possible in the text box below:
University of California, San Francisco
Harvard University
New York University
Stanford University
Columbia University
New York University
Columbia University
Harvard University
University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
University of Maryland, College Park
Indian Institute of Technology Patna
University of Washington
Walt Disney (United States)
Stanford University
Wageningen University & Research
Natural Resources Institute Finland
Salk Institute for Biological Studies
University of Helsinki
Université Paris Cité
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
University of Paris-Saclay
University of British Columbia
University of California, San Diego
National Institute on Drug Abuse
University of British Columbia
Pennsylvania State University