2022 - Research.com Rising Star of Science Award
Roman M. Sheremeta mainly investigates Microeconomics, Rent-seeking, Competition, Resource and Public good. His research integrates issues of Contest design and Risk aversion in his study of Microeconomics. His studies deal with areas such as Endowment, Group decision-making and Lottery as well as Rent-seeking.
His Public good research is multidisciplinary, incorporating elements of Shame and Free riding. His studies in Complete information integrate themes in fields like Construct, Collusion, Common value auction and Externality. His study in Common value auction is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Dynamism, Public economics, Welfare and Conflict avoidance.
Roman M. Sheremeta mainly focuses on Microeconomics, Social psychology, Incentive, Rent-seeking and Competition. His Microeconomics study integrates concerns from other disciplines, such as Contest design and Risk aversion. His Social psychology study which covers Public good that intersects with Social dilemma.
His Incentive research includes themes of Comparative statics and Deception. His Rent-seeking study combines topics in areas such as Test, Mathematical economics, Stochastic game and Lottery. His Competition research is multidisciplinary, relying on both Public economics, Industrial organization, Coordination game and Bounded rationality.
Microeconomics, Incentive, Laboratory experiment, Positive economics and Battle are his primary areas of study. All of his Microeconomics and Nash equilibrium, Collusion, Free riding, Comparative statics and Competition investigations are sub-components of the entire Microeconomics study. His research in Nash equilibrium intersects with topics in Rent-seeking, Status quo and Risk aversion.
His work carried out in the field of Competition brings together such families of science as Communication in small groups and Coordination game. His Incentive research incorporates themes from Advertising, Sample and Social psychology. His Positive economics study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Variety, Empirical research, All-pay auction and Economic model.
Roman M. Sheremeta mostly deals with Microeconomics, Incentive, Competition, Battle and Risk aversion. A large part of his Microeconomics studies is devoted to Coordination game. The Incentive study combines topics in areas such as Quality, Social psychology and Loss aversion.
In general Social psychology, his work in Shame and Harm is often linked to Field, Prestige and Public relations linking many areas of study. He has researched Competition in several fields, including Social identity theory, Altruism, Bounded rationality, Comparative statics and Industrial organization. His Risk aversion study incorporates themes from Rent-seeking and Nash equilibrium.
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Emmanuel Dechenaux;Dan Kovenock;Roman M. Sheremeta;Roman M. Sheremeta.
Experimental Economics (2015)
Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests
Roman M. Sheremeta.
Games and Economic Behavior (2010)
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study
Timothy N. Cason;William A. Masters;Roman M. Sheremeta.
Journal of Public Economics (2010)
CONTEST DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Roman M. Sheremeta.
Economic Inquiry (2011)
Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
Timothy N. Cason;Roman M. Sheremeta;Jingjing Zhang.
Games and Economic Behavior (2012)
OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS
Roman M. Sheremeta.
Journal of Economic Surveys (2013)
Fight or Flight? Defending against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
Cary Deck;Cary Deck;Roman M. Sheremeta.
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2012)
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study
Roman M. Sheremeta;Timothy N. Cason;William A. Masters.
Social Science Research Network (2010)
Facing Your Opponents Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
Shakun D. Mago;Anya C. Samak;Roman M. Sheremeta.
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2016)
Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
Roman M. Sheremeta;Jingjing Zhang.
Social Choice and Welfare (2010)
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