Oliver E. Williamson mainly investigates Corporate governance, Transaction cost, Microeconomics, Industrial organization and Internalization theory. His Corporate governance research is multidisciplinary, relying on both Public policy, Institutional economics, New institutional economics and Organizational theory. In his study, which falls under the umbrella issue of New institutional economics, Schools of economic thought and Relational contract is strongly linked to Business economics.
He has researched Transaction cost in several fields, including Theory of the firm, Opportunism, Bounded rationality, Individualism and Learning-by-doing. His work in the fields of Microeconomics, such as Bidding, intersects with other areas such as Work. His research in Internalization theory focuses on subjects like Asset specificity, which are connected to Organizational economics and Industrial relations.
His primary areas of study are Transaction cost, Corporate governance, Industrial organization, Law and economics and Microeconomics. His research integrates issues of Neoclassical economics and New institutional economics in his study of Transaction cost. Oliver E. Williamson combines subjects such as Business economics, Schools of economic thought and Applied economics with his study of New institutional economics.
His studies deal with areas such as Theory of the firm, Institutional economics, Public policy and Organizational theory as well as Corporate governance. His studies in Industrial organization integrate themes in fields like Production, Bounded rationality and Opportunism. Specifically, his work in Microeconomics is concerned with the study of Asset specificity.
The scientist’s investigation covers issues in Transaction cost, Corporate governance, Industrial organization, Law and economics and Neoclassical economics. Oliver E. Williamson has included themes like Public economics and New institutional economics in his Transaction cost study. His Corporate governance research incorporates themes from Stakeholder, Venture capital, Service, Accounting and Internal control.
His work on Vertical integration as part of general Industrial organization research is frequently linked to Section, bridging the gap between disciplines. He works mostly in the field of Law and economics, limiting it down to concerns involving Coase theorem and, occasionally, Institution, Object and Order. His biological study spans a wide range of topics, including Organizational economics and Organizational theory.
Oliver E. Williamson mostly deals with Transaction cost, Corporate governance, Industrial organization, Internalization theory and Empirical research. His study in Transaction cost is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Public economics and Scope. His Public economics research is multidisciplinary, incorporating elements of Property rights and Service.
The concepts of his Corporate governance study are interwoven with issues in Delegation, Accounting and Credibility. Oliver E. Williamson studies Vertical integration which is a part of Industrial organization. His Internalization theory research incorporates elements of Opportunism, Institutional economics, Bounded rationality, New institutional economics and Monopoly.
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Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications : a study in the economics of internal organization
Oliver E Williamson.
Published in <b>1975</b> in New York (N.Y.) by Free press (1975)
Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications : a study in the economics of internal organization
Oliver E Williamson.
Published in <b>1975</b> in New York (N.Y.) by Free press (1975)
Markets and Hierarchies
Oliver E. Williamson.
(1975)
Markets and Hierarchies
Oliver E. Williamson.
(1975)
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
William Ouchi;Oliver E. Williamson.
Administrative Science Quarterly (1977)
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
William Ouchi;Oliver E. Williamson.
Administrative Science Quarterly (1977)
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Oliver E. Williamson.
The Journal of Law and Economics (1979)
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Oliver E. Williamson.
The Journal of Law and Economics (1979)
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Oliver E. Williamson.
(1994)
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Oliver E. Williamson.
(1994)
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