2005 - Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
2002 - William H. Riker Prize for Political Science For advancing the scientific study of politics through research on positive political theory and its implications for the analysis of democratic institutions.
His primary areas of investigation include Mathematical economics, Politics, Voting, Political economy and Valence. His Mathematical economics research incorporates elements of Simple and Pure mathematics. His Politics study integrates concerns from other disciplines, such as Legislature and Economic system.
His Legislature research focuses on Ranked voting system and how it connects with Public administration, Democracy and Competition. His work in Voting addresses subjects such as Majority rule, which are connected to disciplines such as Finite set and Preference. His research integrates issues of Law, Salience and Political communication in his study of Political economy.
His scientific interests lie mostly in Political economy, Politics, Mathematical economics, Voting and Democracy. In his study, Public finance is inextricably linked to International political economy, which falls within the broad field of Political economy. His Politics research includes elements of Competition, Valence and Public administration.
Norman Schofield usually deals with Mathematical economics and limits it to topics linked to Preference and Space. His studies in Voting integrate themes in fields like Core, Majority rule, Pure mathematics and Combinatorics. His study in Democracy is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing from both Comparative politics, Rational choice theory, Legislature and Law and economics.
Political economy, Politics, Democracy, Social choice theory and Presidential election are his primary areas of study. As a part of the same scientific study, Norman Schofield usually deals with the Political economy, concentrating on Proportional representation and frequently concerns with Electoral system. His research in Politics intersects with topics in Valence and Public administration.
Social choice theory is a subfield of Mathematical economics that Norman Schofield studies. His Mathematical economics research is multidisciplinary, relying on both Preference and Voting. His Presidential election research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Electoral politics, Presidential system, Public relations and Nash equilibrium.
Norman Schofield mainly focuses on Politics, Political economy, Valence, Econometrics and Perception. The Politics study combines topics in areas such as Public finance, Globalization, Nash equilibrium and Public administration. His Public administration study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Social choice theory, Soul, Proportionality and Majoritarian representation.
His Political economy research is multidisciplinary, incorporating elements of Animal spirits, Opposition and Autocracy. Norman Schofield combines subjects such as Political system, Microeconomics and Economic system with his study of Valence. His work on Logit as part of general Econometrics research is frequently linked to Variable, Spatial model and Stochastic modelling, thereby connecting diverse disciplines of science.
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Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe
Michael Laver;Norman Schofield.
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
The Review of Economic Studies (1978)
Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics
Norman Schofield;Itai Sened.
Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States
Gary Miller;Norman Schofield.
American Political Science Review (2003)
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
Richard D. McKelvey;Norman Schofield.
Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments
European Journal of Political Research (1993)
Valence Competition in the Spatial Stochastic Model
Journal of Theoretical Politics (2003)
Generic Instability of Majority Rule
The Review of Economic Studies (1983)
Structural instability of the core
Richard D. McKelvey;Norman Schofield.
Journal of Mathematical Economics (1986)
Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in European coalition governments 1945-83
Norman Schofield;Michael Laver.
British Journal of Political Science (1985)
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