2005 - Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
2002 - William H. Riker Prize for Political Science For advancing the scientific study of politics through research on positive political theory and its implications for the analysis of democratic institutions.
His studies examine the connections between Social preferences and genetics, as well as such issues in Microeconomics, with regards to Social choice theory. His research on Law frequently links to adjacent areas such as Social Welfare. His Social Welfare study often links to related topics such as Law. Many of his studies on Market economy apply to Welfare as well. His research is interdisciplinary, bridging the disciplines of Market economy and Welfare. While working on this project, he studies both Mathematical economics and Public economics. Norman Schofield brings together Public economics and Mathematical economics to produce work in his papers. Section (typography) is closely attributed to Operating system in his work. His research on Operating system often connects related topics like Section (typography).
This overview was generated by a machine learning system which analysed the scientist’s body of work. If you have any feedback, you can contact us here.
Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe
Michael Laver;Norman Schofield.
(1990)
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Norman Schofield.
The Review of Economic Studies (1978)
Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics
Norman Schofield;Itai Sened.
(2006)
Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States
Gary Miller;Norman Schofield.
American Political Science Review (2003)
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
Richard D. McKelvey;Norman Schofield.
Econometrica (1987)
Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83
Norman Schofield;Michael Laver.
British Journal of Political Science (1985)
Valence Competition in the Spatial Stochastic Model
Norman Schofield.
Journal of Theoretical Politics (2003)
Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments
Norman Schofield.
European Journal of Political Research (1993)
Generic Instability of Majority Rule
Norman Schofield.
The Review of Economic Studies (1983)
Structural instability of the core
Richard D. McKelvey;Norman Schofield.
Journal of Mathematical Economics (1986)
If you think any of the details on this page are incorrect, let us know.
We appreciate your kind effort to assist us to improve this page, it would be helpful providing us with as much detail as possible in the text box below:
New York University
University of Kansas
California Institute of Technology
Harvard University
Washington University in St. Louis
University of Maryland, College Park
Georgia Institute of Technology
Washington University in St. Louis
Purdue University West Lafayette
Wilfrid Laurier University
Carnegie Mellon University
Technical University of Berlin
Kyoto University
University of Toronto
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Donald Danforth Plant Science Center
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań
Nanjing Agricultural University
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Agricultural Research Service
University of Pittsburgh
Cornell University
University of Oulu
Case Western Reserve University
University of East Anglia