2005 - Fellows of the Econometric Society
Microeconomics, Incentive, Collusion, Industrial organization and Public economics are his primary areas of study. When carried out as part of a general Microeconomics research project, his work on Competition and Adverse selection is frequently linked to work in Principal, Delegation and Agency, therefore connecting diverse disciplines of study. His Adverse selection research includes elements of Moral hazard, Behavioral economics, Contract theory and Law and economics.
The Incentive study combines topics in areas such as General partnership, Private finance initiative and Opportunism. His research integrates issues of Outcome, Transaction cost and Mechanism design in his study of Collusion. His Public economics research focuses on subjects like Subsidy, which are linked to Substitute good.
David Martimort focuses on Microeconomics, Incentive, Information asymmetry, Public economics and Private information retrieval. His work on Competition, Moral hazard and Adverse selection as part of general Microeconomics research is frequently linked to Agency and Principal, thereby connecting diverse disciplines of science. David Martimort has researched Incentive in several fields, including Collusion, Industrial organization, Opportunism and Finance.
David Martimort has included themes like Outcome and Transaction cost in his Collusion study. His Information asymmetry research is multidisciplinary, relying on both Complete information, Commercial policy, Autarky and Public good. The various areas that David Martimort examines in his Public economics study include Economic interventionism and Ex-ante.
His main research concerns Information asymmetry, Microeconomics, Private information retrieval, Competition and Mechanism design. His research on Information asymmetry also deals with topics like
Private information retrieval is intertwined with Non-renewable resource and Incentive in his study. In the field of Incentive, his study on Moral hazard overlaps with subjects such as Field. His study looks at the relationship between Mechanism design and topics such as Externality, which overlap with Industrial organization, Robustness and Optimal mechanism.
David Martimort mostly deals with Microeconomics, Information asymmetry, Private information retrieval, Mechanism design and Incentive compatibility. David Martimort does research in Microeconomics, focusing on Competition specifically. His studies in Information asymmetry integrate themes in fields like Distortion, Precommitment and Complete information.
His Private information retrieval research includes a combination of various areas of study, such as Non-renewable resource, Stock, Incentive, Finance and Principal–agent problem. His Incentive research is multidisciplinary, incorporating perspectives in Margin and Monopoly. His Incentive compatibility research integrates issues from Economic interventionism, Public economics, Subsidy, Participation constraint and Commercial policy.
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The Theory of Incentives
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
(2001)
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
(2001)
Collusion under asymmetric information
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
Econometrica (1997)
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships
Elisabetta Iossa;David Martimort.
Research Papers in Economics (2015)
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public–private partnerships
David Martimort;Jerome Pouyet.
International Journal of Industrial Organization (2008)
Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
Econometrica (2000)
COMPETING MECHANISMS IN A COMMON VALUE ENVIRONMENT
Bruno Biais;David Martimort;Jean-Charles Rochet.
Econometrica (2000)
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
The RAND Journal of Economics (1999)
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory
David Martimort.
The RAND Journal of Economics (1996)
Collusion and Delegation
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
The RAND Journal of Economics (1998)
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