1993 - Yrjö Jahnsson Award
Elected Fellow of the European Economic Association
His primary scientific interests are in Microeconomics, Incentive, Public economics, Competition and Industrial organization. His Microeconomics research includes themes of Pooling, Risk aversion and Principal. The Incentive study combines topics in areas such as Natural monopoly, Information economics, Procurement, Contract theory and Law and economics.
As a part of the same scientific study, he usually deals with the Law and economics, concentrating on Quality and frequently concerns with Moral hazard. His Public economics research is multidisciplinary, relying on both Social Welfare, Principal–agent problem and Investment. His studies deal with areas such as Discretion and Separation of powers as well as Competition.
The scientist’s investigation covers issues in Microeconomics, Incentive, Industrial organization, Competition and Public economics. Many of his studies on Microeconomics involve topics that are commonly interrelated, such as Risk aversion. His research in Incentive intersects with topics in Power, Decentralization, Investment and Principal.
Jean-Jacques Laffont has included themes like Natural monopoly, Private sector and Universal service in his Industrial organization study. His Competition research includes elements of Price discrimination, Discretion and Monopoly. Jean-Jacques Laffont regularly ties together related areas like Government in his Public economics studies.
Jean-Jacques Laffont mainly focuses on Microeconomics, Incentive, Industrial organization, Public economics and Information asymmetry. His Microeconomics research incorporates elements of Enforcement and Decentralization. Jean-Jacques Laffont combines subjects such as Competition, Universal service and Subsidy with his study of Incentive.
The various areas that Jean-Jacques Laffont examines in his Industrial organization study include Natural monopoly, Social Welfare, Constraint, Market power and Private sector. His research on Public economics frequently connects to adjacent areas such as Law and economics. The study incorporates disciplines such as Developing country and Public good in addition to Information asymmetry.
Jean-Jacques Laffont mostly deals with Microeconomics, Enforcement, Industrial organization, Public economics and Incentive. His Microeconomics study frequently draws connections to other fields, such as Decentralization. His Enforcement research also works with subjects such as
His Industrial organization study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Natural monopoly, Competition, Market power and Universal service. Jean-Jacques Laffont has researched Public economics in several fields, including Government, Corruption and Law and economics. His work on Adverse selection expands to the thematically related Incentive.
This overview was generated by a machine learning system which analysed the scientist’s body of work. If you have any feedback, you can contact us here.
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Jean Tirole;Jean-Jacques Laffont.
(1993)
The Theory of Incentives
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
(2001)
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Jean-Jacques Laffont;David Martimort.
(2001)
A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion
Richard E. Kihlstrom;Jean-Jacques Laffont.
Journal of Political Economy (1979)
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Jean-Jacques Laffont;Jean Tirole.
Journal of Political Economy (1986)
Competition in Telecommunications
Jean-Jacques Laffont;Jean Tirole.
Research Papers in Economics (2001)
The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
Jean-Jacques Laffont;Jean Tirole.
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1991)
Competition in telecommunications
Jean Tirole;Jean-Jacques Laffont.
(1999)
Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
Jerry R. Green;Jean-Jacques Laffont.
Econometrica (1977)
Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing
Jean Jacques Laffont;Patrick Rey;Patrick Rey;Jean Tirole.
The RAND Journal of Economics (1998)
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