David E. M. Sappington mostly deals with Microeconomics, Incentive, Industrial organization, Profit and Economic rent. His study in the field of Production, Marginal cost and Price discrimination is also linked to topics like Private information retrieval and Principal–agent problem. His Incentive research is multidisciplinary, incorporating elements of Information management, Public economics and Finance.
His Public economics study combines topics in areas such as Government and Intervention. The Industrial organization study combines topics in areas such as Competition, Telecommunications, Procurement and Public finance. His work on Profit maximization as part of general Profit study is frequently linked to Verifiable secret sharing, therefore connecting diverse disciplines of science.
His primary scientific interests are in Microeconomics, Incentive, Industrial organization, Public economics and Production. He has researched Microeconomics in several fields, including Procurement and Welfare. David E. M. Sappington interconnects Telecommunications, Marketing, Competitor analysis, Revenue and Earnings in the investigation of issues within Incentive.
His Industrial organization study combines topics in areas such as Competition, Public finance, Profit and Price-cap regulation. In his research on the topic of Production, Goods and services is strongly related with Intervention. His research integrates issues of Actuarial science and Adverse selection in his study of Moral hazard.
His scientific interests lie mostly in Industrial organization, Environmental economics, Distributed generation, Microeconomics and Welfare. His Industrial organization study combines topics from a wide range of disciplines, such as Incentive, Price-cap regulation and Competition. His Incentive research focuses on subjects like Revenue, which are linked to Average cost and Operating cost.
The study incorporates disciplines such as Procurement and Operations management in addition to Environmental economics. Production is the focus of his Microeconomics research. His Welfare research incorporates elements of Labour economics and Monetary economics.
The scientist’s investigation covers issues in Microeconomics, Welfare, Public finance, Environmental economics and Compensation. His work on Production and Bidding as part of general Microeconomics research is often related to Private information retrieval, thus linking different fields of science. His work carried out in the field of Welfare brings together such families of science as Expected return, Labour economics, Foreclosure, Product and Adverse selection.
David E. M. Sappington has included themes like Incentive, Competition and Industrial organization in his Public finance study. His Competition research includes elements of Telecommunications, Price-cap regulation and Distribution. He combines subjects such as Activity-based costing, Cost allocation, Intervention, Performance-based regulation and Outcome with his study of Industrial organization.
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Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
David E. M. Sappington.
Journal of Economic Perspectives (1991)
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
David E. M. Sappington.
Journal of Economic Perspectives (1991)
Privatization, information and incentives
David E. M. Sappington;Joseph E. Stiglitz.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (1987)
Privatization, information and incentives
David E. M. Sappington;Joseph E. Stiglitz.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (1987)
Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent
David E. M. Sappington.
Journal of Economic Theory (1983)
Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent
David E. M. Sappington.
Journal of Economic Theory (1983)
Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization
Mark Armstrong;David E. M. Sappington.
Journal of Economic Literature (2006)
Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization
Mark Armstrong;David E. M. Sappington.
Journal of Economic Literature (2006)
Countervailing incentives in agency problems
Tracy R Lewis;David E.M Sappington.
Journal of Economic Theory (1989)
Countervailing incentives in agency problems
Tracy R Lewis;David E.M Sappington.
Journal of Economic Theory (1989)
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